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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, a municipal cor-
poration of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
Vs. 
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, State Engi-
neer of the State of Utah; 
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSOC-
IATION, a corporation; KENNE-
COTT COPPER CORPORATION, a cor-
poration; SALT LAKE CITY, a 
municipal corporation, CENTRAL 
UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT; 
UTAH LAKE DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, 
a corporation; UNITED STATES OF 
Al-!ERICA, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; 
HUGH McKELLAR, as Provo River 
Commissioner; and PROVO RESER-
VOIR WATER USERS COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants & Appellants. 
CASE NO. 14,605 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e), U.R.C.P., defendants and appellants 
petition the above entitled Court for a rehearing and respectfully 
allege that the Court erred in the following particulars: 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT ON THE PRIOR APPEAL 
THIS COURT IN SUBST&~CE FOUND A MATERIAL FACT OR 
FACTS TO BE IN ISSUE AND REVERSED THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Nowhere in the prior opinion of this Court does it appear 
or was it ordered that the summary judgment was reversed. Provo 
City Court v. Lambert, 28 Utah 2d 194, 499 P.2d 1296 (1972). 
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Likewise, on the prior appeal, both sides had filed mutual Motions 
For Summary Judgment and in so doing, both sides specifically 
represented to the court that there was no genuine issue as to 
any material fact (Defs.' Motion- R.77-80 incl., 191; Pltf.'s 
Motion - R.l22-128, incl.) This was so because the construction 
or interpreta'tion of a judgment presented a question of law for 
the court. Callan v. Callan (Wash.) 468 P.2d 456 (1970). 
Both sides having sought an interpretation of paragraph 4 (c) 
of the Provo River Decree, laid the controversy in the lap of the 
trial court by filing mutual Motions For Summary Judgment. Mastic 
Tile Division of Ruberoid Co. v. Acme Distributing Co., 15 Utah 2d 
136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964). We are mindful of the rule that once 
both parties move for summary judgment the court is not bound to 
grant it to one side or another. Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travelers 
Indemnity Co., 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705 (1968). However, where 
the parties do not dispute each other as to the essential facts, 
and each relies on them insisting on its right to prevail as a 
matter of law, it is proper to determine the issue on summary 
judgment. Robinson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 22 
Utah 2d 163, 450 P.2d 91 (1969); Annotation: 36 ALR 2d 881, §4(a), 
pp. 901-905 inclusive. 
Accordingly, this Court should have decided the matter 
on tDa basis of the record then before it. However, it then seemed 
that it would be helpful to this Court in making a proper deter-
mination and interpretation of what was intended by the language 
set forth in the Provo River Decree had the record contained some 
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information as to what use, if any, the plaintiff had made of 
16.50 second feet of water, since its use in the operation of 
the various mills had ceased. That was the basis upon which 
this Court remanded this case to the District Court. 
The sum and substance of it all was that there was no 
genuine issue of fact before the Court on the prior appeal, but 
this Court created one by remanding the matter for a determination 
of the past use of the water which neither party then asserted 
had any probative value as to the interpretation of paragraph 4(c) 
of the Provo River Decree. We respectfully suggest that this 
Court re-examine that aspect of this case in light of the above. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CASTING THIS APPEAL AS A CONTEST 
BETWEEN THE STATE ENGINEER'S FINDINGS ~~D THE 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
In its opinion, this Court quoted from the testimony of 
Judge Maurice Harding in the hearing before the State Engineer 
and then stated: 
"On the basis of such testimony, the Engineer found 
that the mills ceased operating by 1941, and because 
his hydrograph showed a sharp decrease of the diverted 
water in the early 1940's, concluded that the decrease 
was due to the cessation of the mills, and that, 
therefore, the 16.5 second feet granted under para-
graph 4(c) of the Decree was for power purposes, and 
not for irrigation." 
We respectfully submit that the foregoing is an erroneous analysis 
of the record in this case. Nowhere in the State Engineer's 
report (Exhibit D) filed with the trial court, is ~ conclusion 
- 3 -
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made as to whether paragraph 4(c) was a nonconsurnptive use power 
right or an irrigation right. His report was strictly a factual 
determination of the matters referred to him. It was only during 
the evidentiary hearing before the trial court that he expressed 
~ conclusions thereon. Thus, pursuant to a series of questions 
from the tria~ court, the State Engineer concluded that if he 
could not find more land irrigated than was described in paragraphs 
4(a) and 4(b), which supplied 6.2 acre feet per acre without the 
4(c) water, then the 4(c) water was not needed on the acreage 
described in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) but was simply a power right, 
nonconsumptive use power right. (A.68, Tr. 1456). 
That was the only point in the whole remand proceedings 
where the State Engineer expressed any conclusions as to whether 
paragraph 4(c) was a power right. And the only basis upon which 
.he expressed that conclusion was the lack of any additional irri-
gated acreage. 
Nowhere did the State Engineer state or express any 
conclusion as to whether paragraph 4(c) was a power right on 
the basis of when the mills ceased operating. The fact that he 
found that the first mill appears to have ceased operation as 
early as ~ and that all of the mills had ceased operation and 
the use of water for power purposes by the early 1940's (Ex· D, 
p.lB) was not that material to the controversy. Yet the trial 
court seized upon the error in the State Engineer's report as 
being crucial to the credibility of the whole report and con-
trolling as to its ultimate decision. And as we read the opinion 
- 4 -
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of this court, it too considered that really inconsequential error 
as being decisive of the whole case. 
The main thrust of this appeal is that the Amended 
Findings are unsupported by and are contrary to the competent 
evidence. It is not a contest between the State Engineer's 
findings and the findings of the trial court. In appellant's 
primary Brief we labored to point out how and why the Amended 
Findings are unsupported by the evidence. Likewise, we fully 
documented the many respects in which the Amended Findings are 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. To cast 
this controversy as a contest between the State Engineer's 
findings and the findings of the trial court is clearly erroneous 
and to settle that contest by finding that the State Engineer's 
findings are based on questionable evidence whereas the findings 
of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence when 
there is none, is most discouraging and results in a great 
injustice to the water user defendants. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS OPINION ON AN ERRONEOUS 
CONCLUSION OF IRRIGATED ACREAGE. 
If there was anything that came out loud and clear in 
this case, it was that Provo City had never irrigated more than 
2,558.6 acres from the entry of the 1921 Decree until the present 
time. None of the several witnesses referred to in this Court's 
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opinion, who testified at the Engineer's hearing, stated that 
the parcels of land that they remembered as having been irrigated 
~r 
in 1921 wereAincluded in the land set forth in the Decree. 
The only witness who testified one way or the other 
about it was J. Earl Stubbs who testified that all of the lands 
he irrigated were included in the Morse (Provo River) Decree for 
Provo City Irrigation. (A.lO, R.l034, 700). None of the other 
witnesses at the State Engineer's hearing testified one way or 
the other as to whether the irrigated lands were included in 
the Provo River Decree. Thus, we are at a loss to understand 
where the record supports the statement in the opinion that "several 
witnesses testified at the Engineer's hearing that they remembered 
certain parcels of land, not included in the land set forth in 
the Decree, as having been irrigated in 1921." 
The only evidence relating to acreage in excess of the 
2,558.6 acres was based upon irrigable acreage, ie. lands 
susceptible to irrigation, as distinguished from irrigated acreage, 
ie. lands in fact irrigated. The net effect of it all is that 
the trial court awarded Provo City a right to divert and use 
additional water from the Provo River to irrigate some nebulous 
acreage without fixing the number of acres or where located or 
the beneficial use requirements thereof, all of which has to be 
a most erroneous result and contrary to the fundamental principles 
1 
of our water law. Irrigable acreage never has been the basis of 
establishing a water right in this state. Yet that is the effect 
of the opinion of this Court and we respectfully submit must be 
- 6 -
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reversed on a rehearing of this matter. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO HOLD THAT THE 
ACREAGE LIMITATIONS OF PARAGRAPH 4(a) AND 4(b) OF 
THE PROVO RIVER DECREE ARE RES JUDICATA 
Respondent Provo City and Appellant Provo Reservoir Water 
users Company, as successor in interes·t to Provo Reservoir Com-
pany, are both parties to the Provo River Decree (Civil No. 2888). 
The irrigation rights of Provo City were determined and fixed by 
the Provo River Decree on the basis of a total of 2,558.51 acres 
under paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) as the maximum irrigated acreage 
to which it was entitled. The Provo River Decree is res judicata 
and binding on Provo City, both as to the issues that were tried 
and those that were triable. Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 453, 
76 P.2d 946 (1962), Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 45 P.2d 
1044 (1971), National Finance Co. of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 
263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963), Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., (Utah), 521 
P.2d 379 (1974). 
If Provo City had additional irrigated acreage, it was 
encumbent on it to assert its claim thereto in Civil 2888, and 
obtain an award for such additional acreage. Having failed to 
do so, it was and is barred from subsequently asserting such claim 
under the principles of res judicata. The foregoing issue was 
squarely raised in appellant's primary Brief under Point II thereof. 
Nowhere in the Court's opinion is the foregoing issue resolved 
or discussed unless it comes within the category of other arguments 
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presented by defendants which the court believes are without 
merit. 
We respectfully submit that the issue of res judicata is 
not only crucial to this appeal but is crucial to every irrig-
ation right from the Provo River. The very foundation of the 
irrigation rights under the Provo River Decree was the irrigated 
acreages and the duty of water in acres per second foot. If the 
irrigated acreages as decreed therein are not res judicata, the 
Provo River Decree has been emasculated. We respectfully urge 
that this Court re-examine this issue and come to some decision 
as to whether the principles of res judicata apply to the total 
of 2,558.51 acres of land awarded to Provo City under paragraphs 
4(a) and 4(b) of the Provo River Decree. We respectfully submit 
that it does, and this Court should accordingly so hold. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS OPINION THAT DEFENDANTS AS 
JUNIOR APPROPRIATORS WILL NOT BE DEPRIVED OF WATER 
TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED. 
In its opinion, the Court concludes that there is no 
evidence in the record that defendants, or anyone else, have 
filed for the appropriation of the waters in question. As such, 
the Court not only misconstrues the law, but misinterprets the 
record in this case. 
The substance of it all is that one does not file on 
a specific corpus of water. Rather, one files an application to 
appropriate the unappropriated waters of the stream. This the 
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defendants did and evidence of their respective water rights 
was received and are in the record. (Exhibit I, r.l465, 1479; 
Ex. K, r.l481, 1482; Ex. 0, r.l487, 1491, 1492; Ex. S, J, L, 
r.l480, 1481; Ex. N, r.l486, 1487). Furthermore Provo City 
conceded that if it does not get the 16.5 second feet of water 
under paragraph 4(c) of the Provo River Decree, it will go into 
the Provo River (A.70, R.l511) and the trial court acknowledged 
that defendants' water rights will be affected by its decision 
in this case. (A.70, R.l511, 1512). 
It is elementary to our water law that water rights are 
administered on a priority system and any reversion of water rights 
to the public would go first to satisfy the rights of junior 
appropriators. Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land 
and Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 Pac. 2d 634 (1943). If the 
waters in question remain in the Provo River, such waters will be 
distributed to the defendants water users to fill their junior 
rights in accordance with their respective priorities. If such 
waters are delivered to Provo City, the defendant water users will 
be deprived of the use thereof in inverse order of their respec-
tive priorities. To suggest as does the opinion of this Court 
that defendants were required to file on that water is clearly 
erroneous. 
The hydrographs [Exs. 14, 15(a), (b) and (c)] factually 
demonstrate the quantities of water which have been delivered 
to Provo City over the years. It is undisputed that the block of 
water between the red line and the blue line on those exhibits was 
- 9 -
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never called for, received or used by Provo City. Likewise, it 
cannot be disputed that such block of water will be taken away 
from the junior appropriators, notably the defendant water user 
Those are the disastrous consequences of the Amended Judgment. 
We respectfully urge that this Court grant a rehearing and 
remedy those disastrous consequences. 
Jensen 
sistant Atto ey General 
Attorney for efendants and 
Appellants, State Engineer 
and River Commissioner 
442 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
submitted, 
sep Novak, 
ttorney for Defendants and 
Appellants Provo River Water 
Users Association, Utah Lake 
Distributing Company and 
Provo Reservoir Water Users 
Company, and for and in behal 
of all remaining Appellants 
except State Engineer 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 27~ day of February, 
1978, I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Petition For 
Rehearing to 
Jackson Howard 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Ramon M. Child, 
United States Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant United States of . 
America, Bureau of ReclamatlO 
200 u. S. Post Office and 
Courthouse Building 
. Salt Lake :32 Utah 84101 (~Atto=fi( 
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